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1Introduction 
Imagine that you are a freshman in high school.  You are sitting in your first period class 
when the principal and vice-principal unexpectedly enter the classroom.  The two administrators 
tell the entire class to leave their belongings exactly where they are and to exit the classroom.  As 
you exit the classroom, you notice a police officer and police dog standing just outside the door.  
You have no choice but to walk by both the officer and her dog as you exit the room.  The dog 
sniffs the air around you as you pass.  About twenty minutes later, you are told to return to your 
desk.  As you return, you are again forced to walk in front of the officer and her dog.  You later 
learn that the dog was sniffing you for drugs.  Now answer this question:  have you been 
searched and, if so, is the search justified? 
Is your decision to this question affected by the increasing presence of illegal drugs in our 
nation’s schools?  The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia 
University completed a 2005 study concluding that 2.4 million, or 28% of middle school 
students, and 10.6 million, or 62 percent of high school students, will attend schools where drugs 
are used, kept, or sold.  Respectively, these figures are 41 and 47 percent higher than there were 
in 2002.  The numbers are even more alarming because the Center claims that teens who attend 
schools where drugs are used, kept, or sold are “three times likelier to have tried marijuana, three 
times likelier to get drunk in a typical month, and twice as likely to have tried alcohol, compared 
to teens who attend drug-free schools.”1
Does the inability of schools to deal with the increasing presence of illegal drugs impact 
your answer to the question?  Keep in mind that the increasing presence of drugs on school 
 
1 The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, National Survey of American 
Attitudes on Substance Abuse X: Teens and Parents (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.casacolumbia.org/Absolutenm/articlefiles/Teen_Survey_Report_2005.pdf 
2campuses suggests that traditional means of combating the problem are unable to address the 
problem for most schools.  This is why some schools are using specially trained dogs to sniff 
students.  These schools subject their students to the canine sniffs without regard to whether an 
individual student was suspected of possessing or using drugs.  Such sniffs are called 
suspicionless sniffs or sniffs without individualized suspicion.   
Having a hard time answering the question?  So is the United States Supreme Court.  The 
Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on whether suspicionless canine sniffs violate a public 
school student’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches.  In fact, as this 
article discusses, the Supreme Court has acted in a manner that actually increases uncertainty 
around the issue.  The uncertainty makes employing suspicionless canine sniffs difficult for 
public schools.  
This article attempts to help public school officials decide if they want to try 
implementing a suspicionless canine search program and, if so, how to develop such a program.  
The first section of this article provides a background on how the Fourth Amendment governs 
public school officials.  The second section discusses the Supreme Court’s actions that have 
helped fuel uncertainty about whether suspicionless canine searches in schools violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  The third section provides guidance to public school officials on how to decide if a 
suspicionless canine sniff program is appropriate for their school(s) and, if so, how to best 
implement such a program. 
3Section I:  Applying the Fourth Amendment to a Public School 
The Fourth Amendment prevents government officials2 and their agents from conducting 
unreasonable searches and seizures3. The term “government officials” includes entities at all 
levels of government, including Federal, state, and local.4 No matter how egregious the 
behavior, a person other than a government official can search and seize people and property 
without violating the Fourth Amendment.5 For example, a City of Davis police officer violates 
the Fourth Amendment if he or she conducts an unreasonable search or seizure, such as 
performing a traffic stop on a vehicle for no reason or based solely on a hunch that the driver 
committed a crime.6 In contrast, a gated community can employ a private security guard to stop 
and physically search all non-residents who wish to enter its property with impunity from the 
Fourth Amendment.7 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment could not bar private schools from 
using suspicionless canine sniffs to determine if its students possess illegal drugs.8 However, the 
Fourth Amendment would bar public schools from using drug dogs to sniff students under two 
conditions:  if public school officials qualify as government officials and if canine sniffs are an 
unreasonable search.  This section explores both issues. 
 
2 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
3 U.S Const. amend. IV. 
4 Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment extends to state agents through the 
Fourth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
5 U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (holding that accidental, deliberate, reasonable, and unreasonable 
searches and seizures conducted by private characters do not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
6 Brown v. Tex., 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment barred a person from being punished under 
a Texas statute for refusing to identify himself because “the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe 
appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct”).   
7 Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 935 (1996); (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment is not applicable to a private security guard who, while employed by a public entity, shot someone 
because his assigned powers were not exclusively reserved for police and because he possessed powers no greater 
than those of armed security guards who are commonly employed by private companies to protect private property). 
8 Even though the Fourth Amendment may not apply, private entities can not search people with impunity.  Tort law 
does provide some protections. 
4Does the Fourth Amendment Consider Public School Officials to be Government Officials? 
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court firmly decided in New Jersey v. T.L.O. that 
public school officials are included under the Fourth Amendment’s definition of government 
officials. 9 Prior to the decision, courts had no consistent answer for this issue.  Some courts held 
that public school teachers and administrators were not government officials because they were 
not acting on behalf of the government, but in place of the students’ parents who do not need a 
warrant to search their children or their children’s property.10 Other courts made the 
determination on a case by case basis based on the intrusiveness of the search in question11 or on 
the extent to which school officials cooperated with police.12 The Supreme Court ended the 
debate by holding that the public school teachers and administrators are government agents.13 
The Court’s reasoning included that school districts should operate under the Fourth Amendment 
and the other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights,14 that school districts are empowered 
by publicly mandated polices which makes them more than surrogates of the parents,15 and that 
school children should see that the principles of government are serious and important to a free 
society.16 As a result, the United States Supreme Court has included public school officials 
squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s definition of government officials. 
 
9 N.J. v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). 
10 See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, (1970); In re 
Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509 (1969); R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State,
450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). 
11 See M. M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979). 
12 See M. v. Bd. of Ed. Ball-Chatham Cmty. Unit Sch.l Dist. No. 5, 429 F.Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. 
Wielgos, 410 F.Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498 (1975). 
13 T. L. O., 469 U.S. at 337 
14 I.d. at 335, 337 (the Court noted its earlier decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969) holding that public school officials are bound to some degree by First Amendment principles). 
15 Id. at 337. 
16 Id. at 335 (the Court quoted W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. V. Barnette, 319. U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
5Are Suspicionless Canine Sniffs of Public School Children An Unreasonable Search? 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches performed by 
government officials.  Generally, a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is 
supported by a warrant or by probable cause.  For example, government officials and their agents 
need a warrant supported by probable cause to search a person’s home;17 a police officer needs 
probable cause to arrest a person18 or search a person’s car.19 A warrant and probable cause are 
the highest and the second highest levels of Fourth Amendment protection respectively.  They 
both require individualized suspicion.20 As with most legal rules, however, there are exceptions.  
The courts have found searches to be reasonable even though they were not supported by a 
warrant or probable cause.  Courts do so when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”21 The remainder 
of this sub-section traces the United States Supreme Court’s increasing willingness to consider 
suspicionless searches performed by public school officials to be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In its 1985 opinion for New Jersey v. T.L.O., the United States Supreme Court took the 
first step in finding that searches performed by public school officials without a warrant or 
probable cause could be reasonable.  The relevant facts of this case began with a teacher 
claiming to have found a fourteen year-old freshman (hereafter “Minor”) and her companion 
smoking in a school restroom.22 Since the school expressly prohibited smoking in its restrooms, 
 
17 Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (noting that "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has 
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”) 
18 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
19 Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
20 U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (holding that a warrant can only be issued upon a showing of 
probable cause); Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925) (holding that probable cause is believing that seizable 
evidence will be found on the premises or person to be searched).   
21 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). 
22 T. L. O., 469 U.S. at 329. 
6the teacher took the two students to meet with the vice principal.23 During the meeting, the 
Minor denied smoking in the restroom and further claimed that she did not smoke at all.24 The 
vice principal searched the Minor’s purse without the student’s permission.25 He saw and 
removed a pack of cigarettes.  The removal of cigarettes led to the discovery of rolling papers 
and, eventually, of evidence suggesting that the Minor was dealing marijuana.26 Ultimately, the 
Minor was charged with violating sections of New Jersey’s criminal laws and with the student 
being suspended from school.27 
The United States Supreme Court heard the Minor’s case.  Justice White delivered the 
opinion of the court.28 Justice White’s opinion did not apply the general legal rule of requiring 
that the vice principal have a warrant or probable cause in order to make his search of the purse 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Instead, the Court concluded that requiring school 
officials to obtain a warrant prior to searching students would be an unworkable standard of 
Fourth Amendment protection because it negates flexibility and “swift and informal disciplinary 
procedures.”29 The Court also dismissed a probable cause standard by simply stating that such a 
standard is “too high.”30 Instead, the Court adopted a two prong “reasonable suspicion” standard 
in determining if the vice-principal’s search of the Minor was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The two prongs were:  (1) there must be a reasonable belief that the search will 
produce evidence that the student violated or is violating a law or a school rule and (2) the scope 
of the search must be reasonably related to the justification.31 The first prong requires a form of 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 330. 
28 Id. at 328. 
29 Id. at 340. 
30 Id. at 341-42. 
31 Id. at 342. 
7individualized suspicion that the student was involved in wrongdoing.  Therefore, the Court’s 
reasonable suspicion standard as applied to public school officials maintained the individualized 
suspicion requirements of the warrant and probable cause standards.  
The Majority believed that this ruling struck a proper balance between the students’ 
privacy interests and the need for public school officials to maintain order and to provide an 
educational environment.32 They felt that it spared teachers and school officials from having to 
learn the intricacies of the probable cause standard and, instead, allowed them to regulate student 
conduct according to reason and common sense.33 In addition, they argued that the rule ensured 
that invasions to student privacy interests are limited to what is necessary for preserving order 
and a proper environment in schools.34 
The T.L.O. decision was the United States Supreme Court’s first step in finding searches 
performed by public school officials without a warrant or probable cause could be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.  The opinion lowered the bar and made it easier for public school 
officials to search their students.  However, the Court maintained a requirement that the searches 
be based on individualized suspicion.  Under this decision, a public school student could not be 
subjected to a suspicionless canine sniff. 
 Ten years after T.L.O., the United States Supreme Court once again lowered the bar on 
what is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment in the public school context.  In 1995, 
the Court decided Vernonia School District  v. Acton.35 Vernonia centered around the 
suspicionless urine testing of student athletes.  Starting in the mid-to-late 1980’s, schools within 
 
32 Id. at 343. 
33 Id. at 344. 
34 Id. 
35 515 U.S. 646. 
8the Vernonia School District had a significant rise in their drug problem.36 Drug related 
disciplinary problems doubled and the educational environment was being disrupted by rude 
behavior and outbursts.37 School officials became particularly concerned after learning that the 
athletes were leading the drug culture, for drug use increases the risks of sports related injuries.38 
Coaches attributed some of their school’s athletic injuries to drug usage.39 The students boasted 
that the schools were powerless to stop the growing attraction to drugs.40 Hoping to prove the 
students wrong, the school district tried several options that did not help the drug problem, 
including special classes, speakers, and presentations.41 The District Court concluded that the 
“administration was at its wits end,” that students, particularly athletes, were in a “state of 
rebellion,” and that disciplinary problems had reached “epidemic proportions.”42 As a next step, 
the school received unanimous approval from parents attending an “input night” for its drug 
testing program.43 The policy called for both regular and random urine drug testing of all 
students participating in interscholastic athletics.44 The stated goals of the policy were to deter 
drug use among athletes, to help protect athlete health and safety, and to provide drug assistance 
to those in need.45 The policy had safeguards to help maintain a student’s privacy in regards to 
legal drug use and medical conditions.46 The school district handled all disciplinary issues 
 
36 Id. at 648. 
37 Id. at 649. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 648. 
41 Id. at 649. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 650. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 651-52. 
9arising from positive drug tests internally; the police where not involved when students tested 
positive for illegal drug use.47 
The District’s policy would have been struck down had the Supreme Court followed its 
precedent under T.L.O.  Drug testing a student’s urine is a search,48 and it must be reasonable to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment.  To determine reasonableness, the Supreme Court, in 
T.L.O., adopted a two prong reasonable suspicion standard.  The first prong, as noted above, 
required a degree of individualized suspicion for a search of a public school student to be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  In contrast, the District’s policy in Vernonia required 
all athletes to have their urine drug tested even if they were not individually suspected of using 
drugs.49 The district’s policy is not consistent with the T.L.O. holding, but the Court did not 
follow that holding.
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court did not require individualized suspicion as it had in 
T.L.O. for a variety of reasons.  First, the Court noted it had already upheld suspicionless 
searches in other contexts.  Examples of such suspicionless searches cited by the Court included 
drug testing of railroad personnel who are involved in train accidents, drug testing of federal 
customs officers that carry arms or assigned to drug interdiction, and vehicle checkpoints for 
illegal immigrants, contraband, and drunk driving.50 The Court found that deterring student drug 
use is at least as important as the interests served by the already approved types suspicionless 
searches, for school aged children are more susceptible to the physical, psychological, and 
addictive effects of drugs.51 Second, the Court noted that drugs affect more than just the user 
 
47 Id. at 652. 
48 Id. at 653. 
49 Id. at 650. 
50 Id. at 653-54 (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (U.S. 1989); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 653 (U.S. 1989); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-561 (U.S. 
1976); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (U.S. 1990)). 
51 Id. at 661. 
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because drug usage disrupts the entire educational environment.52 Third, the Court noted that the 
threat of physical harm from drugs is heightened when playing sports.53 In addition, the Court 
noted that the athletes were in a state of rebellion, that disciplinary problems had reached 
epidemic proportions, and that drug usage was underlying these problems.54 The Court cited as 
another justification that a vast majority of the student’s parents supported the policy.55 Finally, 
the Court stated that drug testing based on reasonable suspicion standard is more problematic,56 
for it would turn the testing policy into a “badge of shame” for those that are tested,57 would 
allow school officials to drug test in an arbitrary manner that subjects the school to lawsuits,58 
would create further obstacles before testing could be imposed,59 and would not be effectively 
administered because school officials are not prepared and trained in spotting signs that athletes 
are abusing drugs.60 Given these reasons, the Vernonia decision held that suspicionless drug 
testing of student athletes in public schools was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.   
Approximately seven years after Vernonia, the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of 
Education of Independent School District No. 92 v. Lindsay Earls61 expanded the category of 
students who could be subjected to suspicionless urine testing and made it even easier for public 
school officials to conduct such tests.  In 1998, an Oklahoma school district adopted a policy that 
required all of its middle and high school students to be drug tested before participating in an 
extracurricular activity.62 A few of the school’s extracurricular activities awarded credits that 
 
52 Id. at 662. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 663. 
55 Id. at 665. 
56 Id. at 663. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 663-64. 
60 Id. at 664. 
61 Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. Number 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
62 Id. at 826. 
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some students needed in order to graduate.63 Such activities included the Academic Team, 
National Honor Society, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, 
choir, pomp pon, cheerleading, and athletics.64 The policy required drug testing under three 
conditions:  (1) testing prior to participating in any competitive extracurricular activity, (2) 
random testing while participating in an extra activity, and (3) testing upon suspicion that the 
student was using drugs.65 The drug test looked for illegal drugs, and not for medical conditions 
or prescription drugs.66 The District and the police were responsible for disciplining students 
that failed the test.67 The school district never indicated that it had a drug problem of “epidemic 
proportions”, but the District had a documented problem of drug problems starting in the 1970s 
that the Court found presented a “legitimate cause for concern.”68 
In Earls, the Court cited several reasons for upholding the District’s policy of testing all 
students involved in extracurricular activities.  The Court noted that the health and safety risks 
associated with drugs, such as death from overdosing, are not limited to student athletes.69 The 
opinion also discussed the problems associated with a reasonable suspicion standard, such as the 
increased burden on teachers that already have the difficult job of maintaining order and 
discipline, the potential for applying the program in an arbitrary and unfair manner to target 
unpopular student groups, and the fear that people would bring excessive lawsuits claiming 
 
63 Amanda Bishop, Students, Urinalysis & Extracurricular Activities: How Vernonia’s Aftermath Is Trampling 
Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 217, 230 (2000). 
64 Earls, 536 U.S. at 826. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 833-34. 
68 Id. at 826. 
69 Id. at 836. 
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arbitrary or unfair implementation.70 Finally, the Court explained that testing should not be 
limited to athletes simply because they are the most likely to use drugs.71 
The 2002 Earls decision built upon the Vernonia decision to make the adoption of a 
suspicionless drug testing program easier for public schools.  To uphold the suspicionless urine 
testing program, the Vernonia decision relied in part on the documented drug problem at the 
school.72 In Earls, the Court held that a school district does not necessarily have to document a 
drug problem before implementing a suspicionless drug testing program; however, the Court 
concluded that “some showing does shore up an assertion of special need for a suspicionless 
general search program”73. This case demonstrated that “some showing” is a low standard.  The 
Court concluded that the showing was satisfied from the following facts:  teachers saw students 
who appeared to be under the influence of drugs, students spoke openly about using drugs, a 
drug dog found marijuana cigarettes by a school parking lot, drug paraphernalia was found in the 
car driven by a Future Farmers of America member, and community members were calling the 
school board about the “drug situation.”74 Therefore, the “some showing” is a low standard 
because, arguably, most public high schools are likely to have at least this level of drug related 
activity on their campuses given the prevalence of drugs in today’s society.   
The Court provided several reasons for adopting a low showing standard.  First, the 
country’s drug epidemic makes fighting drugs a pressing concern for all schools.75 Second, the 
Court did not want to make school officials wait for a severe problem before allowing them to 
take corrective action.76 Third, the court commented on previous precedent allowing for 
 
70 Id. at 837. 
71 Id. 
72 515 U.S. at 663. 
73 536 U.S. at 835.  
74 Id. at 834-35. 
75 Id. at 834. 
76 Id. at 836. 
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suspicionless drug testing.77 Finally, the Court would have a very hard time articulating a clear, 
bright-line rule for a reasonable suspicion standard.78 
The T.L.O., Vernonia, and Earls decisions did not expressly or impliedly state whether 
the United States Supreme Court would find that public school officials violate the Fourth 
Amendment by subjecting their students to suspicionless canine sniffs.  The United States 
Supreme Court has not yet heard the issue.  In fact, the Supreme Court has declined review of 
two federal circuit court decisions addressing the issue in 1981 and 1983.79 Given that Earls is a 
recent Supreme Court case that expands the grouping of students who can be subjected to 
suspicionless students and makes it easier for public schools to adopt suspicionless drug testing 
programs, is the Court now ready to allow suspicionless canine sniffs under the Fourth 
Amendment as an alternative to identifying students in possession of drugs on public school 
grounds?  The next section of this paper addresses this question. 
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 463 U.S. 1207 (U.S. 1983). 
14
Section II:  How Does The United States Supreme Court Think Public School Sponsored 
Suspicionless Canine Sniff Programs Measure Up To The Fourth Amendment 
Federal courts have provided conflicting signals about whether a public school official 
must comply with the Fourth Amendment when implementing a suspicionless canine sniffing 
program.  The Supreme Court has so far declined to resolve this conflict.  It has refused to 
review two federal circuit court decisions.   
The Seventh Circuit holds that canine sniffs that are ordered by public school entities and 
that are performed on public students are not searches under the Fourth Amendment.80 In 
contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits currently hold that such canine sniffs are searches.81 
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to suspicionless canine sniff programs 
performed within the Seventh Circuit, but it would regulate such programs within the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits.  The Seventh and Fifth Circuit cases were submitted to the Supreme Court for 
review.82 By refusing to review the Seventh and the Fifth Circuit cases,83 the Supreme Court has 
accepted each Circuit’s holding, thus failing to resolve the split of authority.   
This section first examines the three circuit court decisions addressing the 
constitutionality of suspicionless canine sniff programs at public schools, and then it explains the 
difficulties of reconciling these holdings. 
 
80 Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980). 
81 Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982); B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 1999 
U.S. App. LEXIS 38863 (9th Cir. 1999). 
82 Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (U.S. 1983).  Note that the Ninth Circuit case 
was never submitted to the Court for review.   
83 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit:  Suspicionless Canine Sniffs Of Public School Children Are Not A Search 
As Defined By The Fourth Amendment 
 
The 1980 decision in Doe v. Omer Renfrow84 made the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit the first federal Appellate-level court to address public school programs 
that expose students to suspicionless canine sniffs.  This case involved a junior high and a high 
school campus located on the same site.85 During the twenty days leading up to March 23, 1979, 
the schools documented thirteen incidents of students possessing and/or being under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol.86 Moreover, some students claimed to be afraid of speaking out 
against the drug element for fear of reprisals.87 The drug problem was hurting school moral and 
disrupting the learning environment, and the faculty and administers were frustrated by their 
inability address these issues.88 As a result, the school initiated a suspicionless canine sniff 
program.89 The program included small teams entering classrooms on a random basis.90 Each 
team included a dog, its handler, a school administrator, and a police officer.91 When the team 
entered a classroom, the students sat quietly in their seats with their hands and personal 
belongings on top of their desks.92 The dog was led to each desk to conduct a sniff. 93 During the 
search, a dog alerted to the same student five times.94 The dog continued to alert to the student 
even after she emptied her pockets.95 The student was led to the nurse’s office where two 
women ordered the student to remove her clothing.96 The student was allowed to turn her back 
 
84 Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91. 
85 Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (D. Ind. 1979). 
86 Id. at 1012. 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 1016. 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
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as the two women checked her clothing and hair for contraband.97 No contraband was found and 
the school later learned that, on the morning of the search, the student had been playing with her 
dog and that dog was in heat.98 However, seventeen other students were found in possession of 
drugs as a result of the dog sniffs on March 23, 1979.99 
Based on these events, the student initiated legal action.  She filed a civil complaint 
against the Superintendent of Highland Town School District, the Principals of the high school 
and the junior high school, members of the Highland Town School District Board, the Highland 
Indiana Police Chief, the owner and operator of the canine academy who supplied and helped 
handle the dogs, and others ( “Defendants”).100 The student argued that the suspicionless canine 
sniff program violated her Fourth Amendment rights and sought an injunction against future use 
of the program.101 The Defendants moved for summary judgment based on governmental 
immunity, no constitutional fault, and lack of involvement arguments.102 The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division reviewed the case prior to 
the Seventh Circuit.  On August 30, 1979, District Judge Sharp granted most of the Defendants’ 
motion.103 In so doing, Judge Sharp held that the canine sniff program was not a search.104 The 
Seventh Circuit agreed to review Judge Sharp’s holding.  On July 18, 1980, the Seventh Circuit 
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issued a per curium decision affirming Judge Sharp’s holding that the canine sniff program did 
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.105 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Sharp’s “lengthy, thoughtful” conclusion on the 
“search” question for several reasons.106 First, the Court found that the intrusion from using 
dogs was minimal since a dog was only in each classroom for several minutes.107 The Court 
found the drug problem to be “excessive” given the school’s the documented drug use, the 
impact of drug use on the schools’ learning environment, the schools’ inability to control the 
student drug use, and the students’ attitude towards drugs.108 The Court also noted several other 
reasons for affirming Judge Sharp’s conclusion:  that the program was not a police action, that 
students do not have a privacy interest in the air around them, and that students are already 
constantly supervised while in school.109 Equally important to the Court was the fact that all 
students were searched in the same manner, so the dog sniff was not arbitrarily conducted or 
performed in a manner meant to embarrass any particular student.110 For these reasons, the 
Seventh Circuit does not consider suspicionless canine searches to be a “search” and, as a result, 
such sniffs are not regulated by the Fourth Amendment within the circuit’s jurisdiction. 
 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits:  Suspicionless Canine Sniffs Of Public School Children Are A 
Search As Defined By The Fourth Amendment 
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth an Ninth Circuits have held that suspicionless 
canine sniffs are searches.  Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have published opinions that 
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explain their respective reasoning for reaching the opposite holding of the Seventh Circuit.  The 
two Circuits’ opinions are Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District and B.C. v. 
Plumas Unified School District respectively. 
In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Horton v. Goose 
Creek Independent School District that a dog putting its nose against a student to smell for 
contraband is a search under the Fourth Amendment.111 In that case, the Goose Creek 
Independent School District (GCISD) adopted a canine sniff program to help combat a growing 
drug and alcohol problem at its schools.112 The program involved contracting with a private 
security services firm to bring dogs to the District’s schools to sniff for contraband.113 The firm 
almost exclusively employed Doberman pinschers and German shepherds.114 Before the dogs 
were used, the elementary school students were acquainted with the dogs in school assemblies 
and the junior and senior high school students were “informed” of the program.115 After, the 
leashed dogs were brought into the classrooms on a random and surprise basis to sniff the 
students.116 The dogs were sometimes allowed to sniff students off leash during “playtime”.  
The dogs’ noses would touch the students.117 If the dogs alerted to a student, a school official 
discreetly removed the student from the classroom or play area, and the student’s pockets, purse, 
and outer garments were searched.118 School officials, and not the local police, handled any 
disciplinary issues that arose from the canine sniffs.119 Two of the three plaintiffs in the Horton 
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case were students that triggered alerts by the canines.120 A search of one student’s purse and of 
the other student’s pockets, socks, and pant legs did not yield contraband.121 The holding does 
not indicate whether students other than the two plaintiffs where ever searched as the result of 
dog alerts and, if so, whether the searches led to the discovery of contraband.122 
Based on these events, three students filed a civil complaint on behalf of all students 
enrolled in GCISD to challenge the canine sniff program.123 The complaint alleged that the 
GCISD violated the students’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.124 In an unpublished opinion, a Texas District Court ruled that the canine sniffing 
amounted to a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.125 This finding was unanimously 
reversed by a three-judge panel for the Fifth Circuit on November 1, 1982.126 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling after refusing to expand the plain 
view doctrine.  The plain view doctrine allows police to collect evidence that they plainly see 
from a legal vantage point without triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.127 Federal courts hold that the doctrine includes a police 
canine sniffing luggage because the sniff simply enhances a government agent’s sense of smell 
the same way a flashlight enhances the agent’s sight.128 
The Fifth Circuit cited six reasons for refusing to extend the plain view doctrine to 
include suspicionless canine sniffs performed on public school children.  First, the Court noted 
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that the Fourth Amendment “applies with its fullest vigor” when dealing with searching a 
person’s body.129 Second, the Court reasoned that if the “far less intrusive” metal detectors have 
found to be a search, then the use of large dogs must also be a search.130 Third, a person’s smell 
is not routinely exhibited for all to see; in fact, most people in our society take measures to mask 
their odors.131 Fourth, sniffing is offensive regardless of whether it is done by a person or a 
dog.132 Fifth, the Court noted that adolescents are self-conscious about their bodies and, as a 
result, sniffing the air around them could be highly embarrassing.133 Finally, the Court expressed 
concern that the Doberman pinschers and German shepherds were employed for the program 
because of their image.134 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided by a vote of two-to-one in 
the 1999 holding of B.C. v. Plumas Unified School District that a public school administered 
suspicionless canine sniff program violates a student’s Fourth Amendment rights.135 On May 21, 
1996, the principal and vice principal of a public high school in California’s Plumas Unified 
School District instructed a classroom of students to exit the room.136 As they exited, the 
students passed by a Deputy Sheriff and the deputy’s drug-sniffing dog located next to the 
classroom door.137 When the room was empty, the dog sniffed the student’s desk and any 
belongings left in the room.138 When the students returned to the classroom, the dog and handler 
were located next to the classroom door.139 The dog alerted to the same student twice, once 
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when he or she left the room and once when he or she re-entered the classroom.140 The student 
was searched.141 No drugs were found at the high school that day.142 
B.C. filed a civil action naming the Plumas Unified School District, the superintendent, 
the principal, the vice principal, and members of the sheriff’s department as defendants.143 B.C. 
claimed that his or her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches had been violated 
by the canine sniffing program administered by the defendants.144 In an unpublished opinion, 
Chief District Judge Karlton of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California145 held that the canine sniff performed on B.C. amounted to an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment.146 A divided three judge panel from the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed this holding.147 
The majority opinion provided little explanation for the court’s refusal to extend the plain 
sight doctrine to the facts of this case.  In United States v. Place and United States v. Beale, the 
United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, respectively, had held that 
that a canine sniff of luggage was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.148 However, the 
Plumas majority noted that a dog sniff performed on a person is more intrusive than a dog sniff 
performed on unattended luggage.149 In distinguishing Place and Beale, the court also reiterated 
many of the same factors the Fifth Circuit highlighted:  the personal nature of one’s body, the 
fear caused by dogs, and the involuntary and random nature of the search.150 Thus, the Ninth 
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Circuit concluded that the use of suspicionless canine sniffs in B.C. amounted to a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.151 
In contrast to Horton, the deputy’s dog in B.C. did not have physical contact with the 
students.152 The dog’s nose never actually touched any of the students.  Nevertheless, the Ninth 
Circuit opinion concluded that the public school students were searched even though they were 
never touched in anyway by the canine.153 The court also noted that the case was devoid of facts 
disclosing “that there was any drug crisis or even a drug problem at Quincy High in May 
1996.”154 Taken together, these facts suggest that the Ninth Circuit is not any more likely to 
uphold a suspicionless canine sniff program simply because the dog does not actually touch the 
student, but it may uphold such a program as reasonable if a school has a documented drug 
problem. 
 
What to Make of the Contrasting Authority 
By ruling that suspicionless canine sniffs are not a search, the Seventh Circuit removed 
the sniffs from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  In contrast, the Horton decision, by ruling that 
canine sniffs are searches, would provide public school students with Fourth Amendment 
protection for dog snifts.  The Supreme Court declined to review Horton two years after refusing 
to review Doe. This, standing alone, could support an argument that the Supreme Court’s view 
on suspicionless canine sniffs changed over time to provide school children with greater Fourth 
Amendment Protections and, as a result, the Horton decision provides a more reliable indicator 
of the Supreme Court’s view on the issue then the Doe decision.  However, this conclusion is 
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negated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions.  Since refusing to review Horton in 1983, 
the Supreme Court decided T.L.O. in 1985,155 Vernonia in 1995,156 and Earls in 2002.157 Each of 
the three cases progressively minimizes the level of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to 
public school students.  Therefore, a trend argument would actually suggest that the Supreme 
Court is more likely to adopt the position of the Seventh Circuit in Doe rather than the Fifth 
Circuit’s view in Horton.
The reasoning and the decisions do not provide a way to reconcile the conflict.  All three 
circuits addressed the question of whether public school sponsored, suspicionless canine sniffs of 
students are a search under the Fourth Amendment in the same manner.  The three opinions 
simply discussed arguments in support of their position.  For example, the Doe opinion explains 
that students do not have a privacy interest in the air around them,158 students are already 
constantly supervised while in school,159 and all students were searched in the same manner.160 
The Horton and B.C. opinions note that sniffs are more intrusive than metal detectors which are 
searches,161 Doberman pinschers and German shepherds provoke fear,162 and sniffing is 
offensive if it is done by a person or a dog.163 However, an actual value can not be placed on 
these arguments or the other arguments cited in the opinions.  Each argument could generate a 
spectrum of opinions regarding its value depending on the evaluator’s personal views, 
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experiences, and biases.  As a result, there is no way to know which arguments the Supreme 
Court preferred when it refused to grant review of Doe and of Horton.164 
Therefore, a public school is faced with uncertainty on how to best implement a 
suspicionless canine sniff program.  The next section of this paper offers suggestions on how 
interested public schools could best implement canine search programs. 
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Section III:  How A Public School Could Best Implement a Suspicionless Canine Sniff 
Program 
Glaring uncertainty surrounds how public school officials can conduct suspicionless 
activities designed to identify drug users and to combat drug use without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.165 The Supreme Court contributed to this uncertainty by refusing to review the 
Seventh and the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ conflicting holdings on whether suspicionless canine 
sniffs are included in the Fourth Amendment’s definition of a search.  Therefore, public schools 
must be cautious should they want to adopt a suspicionless canine sniff program.  To help, this 
section suggests five steps for helping a public school to decide if a suspicionless canine sniff 
program is appropriate and, if so, how to create such a program.   
The steps provided below are gleaned from three sources:  the two Supreme Court cases 
discussing suspicionless urine testing for drugs in public schools, (Vernonia and Earls); the three 
Circuit Court opinions that address suspicionless canine sniffs (Doe, Horton, and B.C.), and legal 
commentary.   
 
Step 1:  Consider Whether A Suspicionless Canine Sniff Program Is Appropriate For Your 
School (Conduct A “Need Analysis”) 
 
Schools contemplating whether to adopt a suspicionless canine sniff program should 
analyze the need.  An aspect of the “need analysis” should include a collective discussion among 
administrators, school board members, and faculty.  The discussion should address whether the 
concept of a suspicionless canine sniff program is consistent with their school’s culture and if 
their drug problem is severe enough to warrant exposing their students to canine sniffs.  The 
collective discussion should also address whether a less intrusive and more generally acceptable 
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alternative options are available for addressing a drug problem.  In Vernonia, the court identified 
a few alternatives: guest lectures, special education, and property searches.166 Finally, the 
collective discussion should reflect that schools are typically the source of Constitutional 
education for our citizens and students will watch and learn from how the school treats the 
Constitution.167 
In conducting the need analysis, a school should also address the notion that a 
suspicionless canine sniff program does not deter students from using drugs and, in practice, 
actually encourages students not to associate or participate with students groups that are targeted 
for sniffing.168 Testing certain student groups creates the possibility that, rather then stopping 
their use of illegal drugs, at least some students will choose to disassociate with the grouping.169 
Justice Ginsburg noted this possibility in his dissent to Earls:
“[e]ven if students might be deterred from drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular 
eligibility, it is at least as likely that other students might forgo their extracurricular involvement in 
order to avoid detection of their drug uses.”170 
If this is true, the students who choose not to participate in order to continue using drugs are 
driven away from the protective and constructive environments that extracurricular activities 
create.171 These students will spend less time on campus and less time under the supervision of 
school officials that can monitor them and encourage them to get help.172 Therefore, a need 
analysis should include a discussion of whether a school believes that some students will not 
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associate with student groups in order to avoid detection and, if so, whether a suspicionless 
canine sniff program is worth the cost. 
Finally, the need analysis for a program should involve parental input.  In upholding a 
suspicionless urine test, the Supreme Court in Vernonia noted with approval that a vast majority 
of the students’ parents supported the suspicionless urine testing policy.173 Therefore, a school 
district should inventory parental support for a suspicionless canine sniff program as part of a 
need analysis. 
 
Step 2:  Showing The Need For A Suspicionless Canine Sniff Program 
The Vernonia, Earls, and B.C. decisions indicate that a successful suspicionless canine 
sniff program should have goals directed at a documented problem.  Therefore, a school should 
first document its drug problem, then develop goals for combating that problem. 
Both B.C. and Earls provide guidance for documenting a drug problem.  Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in B.C. suggests that the Court may have found the suspicionless canine sniff program in 
question to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment had the school documented a sufficient 
enough drug problem.174 Also, In Earls, the Supreme Court held that a school district does not 
necessarily have to document a drug problem before implementing a suspicionless drug testing 
program; however, the Court concluded that “some showing does shore up an assertion of special 
need for a suspicionless general search program.”175 Accordingly, a school should document as 
many factors indicating a drug problem as possible to help make a court’s decision to uphold a 
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suspicionless canine sniff program easy.  In so doing, a school should keep in mind that greater 
the problem, the more likely a court will be to uphold a suspicionless canine sniff program.176 
To compile such documentation, a school should consult administrators, faculty, and 
local police to learn the number of drug related incidents occurring on and near their campuses 
that involve students.  The Vernonia and Earls decisions provide examples of the type of 
incidents that courts may be interested in:  students appearing to be under the influence of drugs, 
students openly speaking about using drugs, people finding marijuana cigarettes by a school 
parking lot, police finding drug paraphernalia on a student that would be targeted by a 
suspicionless program, community members calling the school board about the “drug 
situation”,177 and the school’s learning environment being disrupted because of drug usage.178 
After a drug problem has been documented, a public school should develop goals for a 
suspicionless canine sniffing program.  In Vernonia, the Supreme Court noted with approval the 
school district’s goals for its suspicionless drug testing program:  to deter drug use among the 
target population, to help protect athlete health and safety, and to provide drug assistance to 
those in need.179 Hence, a school should consider articulating these goals if they are applicable. 
 
Step 3:  Develop Protocol For Dog Selection, Training, and Deployment 
 The third step in developing a suspicionless canine sniff program at a public school is to 
develop protocol for assuring that the dogs used are properly selected, trained, and deployed.  
Such protocol should address the following five issues.  The first issue is breed selection.  In 
Horton, the Fifth Circuit criticized the school district’s use of Doberman pinschers and German 
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shepherds in its canine sniffing program.180 These dogs are known for their image and ability to 
provoke fear.181 Therefore, a schools protocol should limit the breed of dogs that can be used to 
those that are smaller in size and that have a friendlier image, such as hounds and labs. 
 In addition to selecting the proper breed, the protocol for this step should address dog 
training.  The reliability of the dogs used will impact the success of a suspicionless canine 
program.182 The best type of canine to use for this type of program is a “single element point 
source” dog.183 These dogs are trained to follow a scent until they reach the source.184 The 
training, certification, and management of single element point source dogs should be formalized 
and, at a minimum, adhere to federal law enforcement standards.185 These standards include 
training to disregard distractions, such as food, harmless drugs, and residual scents.186 The 
length of training varies, but most programs should last two to three weeks.187 The training 
should also involve more than drug detection, such as working under extraordinary conditions.188 
Also, the dog should be recertified annually and continuously undergo practice searches.189 
The third issue that the protocol should address is how to review a dog’s history prior to 
it being used a program.  Some courts consider a particular canine’s reliability in deciding if a 
sniff is a search and, if so, whether the search is reasonable.190 To be safe, a school should 
review a canine’s history for excessive false alerts and for failing to detect drugs (hereafter “false 
negative”).  Canines with excessive false alerts or false negatives and canines without records 
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should be avoided.  Note that alerts to legal substances and alerts to where there are no drugs at 
all are worse than an alert to a location or person where a drug was once, but no longer, 
located.191 
A school should create protocol for addressing how to select the dog handler(s) used in a 
program.  Almost all false alerts and false negatives result from a handler’s misinterpretation of a 
dog’s signals.192 Some false alerts and false negatives are a product of a handler’s 
subconsciously sent signals that improperly influence a canine’s response.193 Consequently, a 
handler should be trained on how to manage his or her dog, how to interpret his or her dog’s 
signals, and how to work in a school environment.194 Training canine handlers involves more 
time and effort than training of the canine.195 After the training is completed, the handler must 
undergo periodic recertification exercises to ensure that he or she is still reliable.196 
Finally, the protocol developed by a school should also address the number of sniffs a 
dog completes per deployment.  A canine’s success in finding drugs is related to the size of the 
area and/or the number of the people that the dog sniffs per deployment.  The more drug-free 
areas and/or people that a dog sniffs per deployment, the greater the chance a dog will provide a 
false alert.197 This suggests that a school district should limit the number of students that a 
particular dog sniffs at a time. 
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Step 4:  Develop Protocol For Selecting Students To Be Sniffed 
A school needs protocol that dictates which students will be exposed to suspicionless 
canine sniffing.  In Earls, the Supreme Court expanded the types of students that could be 
subject the suspicionless urine testing from student athletes to any student involved in an 
extracurricular activity.198 The decision did not expressly state that the Court would find 
suspicionless drug testing of an entire student body to be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  No school has succeeded in including the entire student body in their grouping for 
a urinalysis drug testing.199 This might be because protocol that ensures a solidly defined student 
grouping based on criteria related to drug use could help a district argue that their program 
incorporates some degree of individualized suspicion.200 Therefore, a school should establish 
protocol for limiting the number of students that will be tested to a group that is something less 
than the entire student body. 
Prior cases provide guidance on how to limit which students would be sniffed.  The 
school district in Vernonia was successful in simply targeting students that participate in school 
athletics.201 Earls held that another valid grouping is all students that participate in 
extracurricular activities.202 A Texas school district made their drug testing program grouping 
based on the degree to which students visibly represent the school.203 The Montana High School 
selected their grouping based on students that have had trouble with attendance, grades, and/or 
fighting and on students that had been caught in possession of or using illegal drugs and drug 
 
198 536 U.S. 826. 
199 Bishop, supra note 63, at 235. 
200 Id. at 231. 
201 515 U.S. at 650. 
202 536 U.S. 826. 
203 Bishop, supra note 63, at 231. 
32
paraphernalia.204 To also help create a grouping, a school could survey its students to garner 
more insight about drug use among various student populations.205 
However, the protocol governing student selection should emphasize mandatory testing.  
A voluntary program may not produce desired results.  The Grapeville-Colleville school district 
in Texas initially implemented a voluntary drug testing program.206 The district, for unknown 
reasons, was unhappy with the voluntary program and later moved to a mandatory drug testing 
program.207 
In addition to governing, the protocol on student selection should stress fairness.  The 
Vernonia and Earls decisions upheld a suspicionless standard over a reasonable suspicion 
standard in part because of fairness concerns.  In both cases, the Supreme Court underscored the 
potential for a suspicion requirement to be implemented in an arbitrary and unfair manner, such 
as by targeting unpopular student groups.208 Even if a suspicion standard was not implemented 
discriminatorily, the Supreme Court was worried that the mere susceptibility of a suspicion 
standard to arbitrary and unfairness claims could chill a program’s implementation.209 
Consequently, a school wishing to develop a program should have protocol assuring that the 
grouping of students targeted for the suspicionless searches is fairly decided and that all in the 
group are sniffed in the same manner.  To assure this, a program should contain clear practical 
and procedural safeguards that limit discretion by the program’s implementers.210 The less 
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discretion given to implementers in selecting who will be sniffed and how those selected will be 
sniffed, the more likely a court will find that the program is fair.211 
The protocol developed for grouping students and for assuring fairness should also stress 
simplicity.  One reason why the Vernonia and Earls decisions upheld the suspicionless urine 
testing was because a reasonable suspicion standard puts an increased burden on teachers that 
already have the difficult job of maintaining order and discipline.212 A school district should be 
careful not to negate this justification by creating a complex or otherwise hard to administer 
suspicionless canine sniffing program. 
 
Step 5:  Develop Protocol To Protect Students State Of Mind And Privacy 
A suspicionless canine sniff program should be designed to safeguard the students’ state 
of mind and their privacy.  A school’s program should include protocol that limits the amount of 
time an individual student is exposed to a dog for sniffing for two reasons.  The first reason is 
that legal authority suggest such limitations an important to the constitutionality of such 
searches.  In Doe, the Seventh Circuit stressed in its decision that suspicionless canine sniffs 
were not a search was because the dogs were only in each classroom for a several minutes.213 
The second reason is common sense.  The longer a student remains still in order to be sniffed, the 
more it seems to an objective observer that sniff was a search. 
The protocol developed for this step should also assure that any disciplinary issues 
arising out of a program are handled internally by the school.  In both Vernonia and Earls, the 
school districts, and not the police, handled disciplinary issues arising from positive drug testing 
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results.214 The Supreme Court noted this in deciding to uphold suspicionless urine testing as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  As a result, any school district wishing to adopt a 
suspicionless canine sniff program should have protocol in place to assure that resulting 
disciplinary issues are handled by the school and not by police. 
Furthermore, the protocol for this step should also prevent dogs from physically touching 
students.  The holding in B.C. suggests that the Ninth Circuit and the courts that follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning will not give any deference to suspicionless canine sniffing programs that bar 
the dogs from actually touching students.215 Nevertheless, a visual inspection is less intrusive 
than a physically invasive search.216 A canine sniff where the dog does not actually physically 
touch a student is arguably more similar to a visual inspection than it is to a physically invasive 
search.  As a result, a suspicionless canine sniff program that prevents the dogs from actually 
contacting students is arguably less intrusive.  This argument will not hurt, and could only help, a 
program’s chances of survival given the Ninth Circuit’s holding in B.C. 
Finally, and probably most importantly, a school should develop protocol that safeguards 
their students’ personal and confidential information.  Drug testing may incidentally reveal legal 
drug use.  The Supreme Court noted in both Vernonia and Earls that the programs in question 
took two precautions to help minimize the privacy impact when a sniff inadvertently detected 
legal drugs on a student.  First, a student had to reveal only enough personal information as was 
necessary to convey that the drug usage in question was legal.217 Second, the number of people 
that received the information was as limited as possible.218 Any suspicionless canine program 
 
214 515 U.S. at 652; 536 U.S. 833-34. 
215 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 38863 at 15. 
216 Sprow, supra note 167, at 160 (citing Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000)). 
217 515 U.S. at 651-52; 536 U.S. 833. 
218 Id. 
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should have protocol that provides the same two precautions to protect the privacy of student 
who legally use drugs. 
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Conclusion 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued decisions that have lowered the level of 
Fourth Amendment protection afforded to public school children.  Most recently, in its 2002 
Earls decision, the Supreme Court upheld a program that subjected public school children 
involved in extracurricular activities to suspicionless urine testing.  However, the Supreme Court 
thus far failed to resolve a Circuit split on the question of whether a public school can employ a 
suspicionless canine sniffing program in a similar manner.   
While the Seventh Circuit has held that canine sniffs ordered by public school entities are 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits held that such canine 
sniffs are a search.  Consequently, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to suspicionless canine 
sniff programs performed within the Seventh Circuit, but it would regulate such programs within 
the Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit.  By refusing to review the Seventh Circuit’s 1981 decision in 
Doe and the Fifth Circuit’s 1983 decision in Horton, the Supreme Court has allowed two 
mutually exclusive holdings to stand and, as a result, created uncertainty for public school 
officials that want to implement a suspicionless canine sniff program.   
Although, there is no clear guidance for how public schools can implement a 
suspicionless canine sniffing program, there are steps that a public school can take to help assure 
that a suspicionless canine sniff program survives judicial scrutiny.  If a public school wishes to 
adopt such a program, they should: 
 
 Step 1:  Consider Whether A Suspicionless Canine Sniff Program Is Appropriate For 
Your School (Conduct A “Need Analysis”) 
 Step 2:  Gather Evidence Showing The Need For A Suspicionless Canine Sniff Program 
 Step 3:  Develop Protocol For Dog Selection, Training, and Deployment 
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 Step 4:  Develop Protocol For Selecting Students To Be Sniffed 
 Step 5:  Develop Protocol To Protect Students State Of Mind And Privacy 
 
This is not a complete list of steps for a school to take in adopting a suspicionless canine 
sniffing program, but they will help ensure that public school officials create and implement a 
program in a manner that complies with the Fourth Amendment.  The steps can not guarantee a 
program will survive judicial scrutiny because there is no Supreme Court case law directly on 
point and because judges and juries can be unpredictable.  Therefore, in addition to these steps, 
schools within the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits should review the Horton, Doe, and B.C. 
decisions respectively for additional insight on developing and implementing a program.  Such 
schools need to comply with their Circuit’s decision because it is binding authority for them.  In 
all jurisdictions, school officials should be sensitive to additional limitations created by state 
constitutions and statutes, and by local policy.  Finally, school districts should also consult their 
legal counsel before implementing a suspicionless canine search program.   
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Appendix A:  Table Contrasting Doe, Horton, and B.C. 
TABLE 1:  The Seventh And The Fifth And Ninth Circuits Arguments Supporting Their 
Holdings on Whether Suspicionless Canine Sniffs Of Public School Children Are A Search 
Under The Fourth Amendment 
 
Seventh Circuit  
(Doe) 
Fifth Circuit 
(Horton) 
Ninth Circuit 
(B.C.) 
• The dogs were only in each 
classroom for several minutes 
• The documented drug use at the 
school 
• The drug use’s effects on the 
school’s learning environment 
• The school’s inability to control 
the student drug use 
• The students’ pro-drug attitude 
• The program was not a police 
action 
• Students do not have a privacy 
interest in the air around them 
• Students are already constantly 
supervised while in school 
• All students were searched in the 
same manner; the program was 
not arbitrarily conducted   
• The Fourth Amendment “applies 
with its fullest vigor” when 
dealing with searching a person’s 
body 
• Sniffs are less intrusive than metal 
detectors, and metal detectors 
have been found to be searches 
• Most people in our society take 
measures to mask their odors 
• Sniffing is offensive regardless if it 
is done by a person or a dog 
• Adolescents are self-conscious 
about their bodies and, as a result, 
sniffing the air around them could 
be highly embarrassing 
• Doberman pinschers and German 
shepherds were employed for the 
program because of their image 
• A canine sniff performed on a 
person is more intrusive than one 
performed on unattended luggage 
• Most people in our society take 
measures to mask their odors 
• Dogs can cause fear 
• The school’s program required 
involuntary and random canine 
sniffing 
